Russian Aggression and NATO's Dilemma

As of late, conflict has arisen in multiple parts of the world, with most media attention focusing on the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. Headlines rightfully speak in the context of pure eurocentrism, but they often fail to recognize the century-long history of the conflict and the events following both the formation and dissolution of the Soviet Union. While it is fair to assume that Russian and Soviet leaders were always the agitators of Russo-Ukrainian conflict, such as during the Ukrainian Civil War of 1917, it is still crucial to assess the impact of foreign relations between Russia and the rest of the world. The formation of NATO in the 1940s was just the beginning of immense pressure put on Russia, continuing into the 21st century and beyond.

The people of Ukraine have endured significant hardships. The Holodomor, the Soviet-induced Terror-Famine, occurred from 1932 to 1933, killing millions of Ukrainians. As part of Joseph Stalin’s plan to collectivize agriculture in 1929, farmland was surrendered to the Soviet Union, leading to the deaths of almost four million Ukrainians. While modern debate continues over whether this manmade famine was a genocide, 16 countries—including Ukraine—view this atrocity as a mass genocide. During the Second World War, German forces began occupying parts of Soviet Ukraine. Initially, the Nazis were viewed as liberators by some, given their common enemies included the Soviet Union and Poland. However, within just the first two days of Nazi occupation, 34,000 Ukrainian Jews were murdered with the help of auxiliary forces recruited from the local population in Kyiv.

Since the close of the Second World War, NATO has insured its member nations with a collective security approach. The military alliance comprises 30 members spread across much of Europe and North America but has strategically left true Ukrainian membership off the table since 2008. The treaty agreed upon is comprised of 14 articles that ensure collective defense, cooperative security, and expansion among member nations. The premise of these articles is rooted deeply in liberal internationalism. However, since the most recent invasion of Ukraine, NATO has only partially upheld its obligations, strategically avoiding a third world war. Russia poses a distinct threat to the original ideals of NATO by undermining its efforts to revise and spread Western democratic principles to post-Soviet states.

Over the past three decades, as NATO has mostly adopted an inclusive approach toward Central and Eastern Europe, the military alliance has expanded by including former Warsaw Pact members, previous allies of the Soviet Union, and the three Baltic states, which were former Soviet republics. Controversially, NATO also attempts to assuage Russia’s worries about NATO expansion. While relations between Ukraine and NATO began in 1992 with the signing of the Partnership for Peace Framework, it was not until 2008 that Ukraine began applying for membership. Efforts made by Ukraine to join the alliance were subdued in 2010 by Viktor Yanukovych, a former President of Ukraine (2005-2010) and governor of Donetsk Oblast (1997-2002), who abandoned the NATO Membership Action Plan. However, after the Maidan Uprising of 2013, Yanukovych fled Ukraine, setting the stage for future talks regarding Ukraine’s NATO membership. Following the Russian annexation of Crimea and the war in the Donbas region in 2014, the new Ukrainian Government made joining NATO one of its highest priorities, with its intent to gain “full-fledged membership” written explicitly in Articles 85, 102, and 116 of the Constitution of Ukraine. As a result of the war in Ukraine, talks involving Ukraine, Russia, and the Organization for the Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE; 57 members across Eurasia and North America) began, leading to the signing of a ceasefire agreement, namely the Minsk Protocol (2014). However, Minsk I failed to stop engagement by Russian military forces. In 2015, another protocol was written, Minsk II, and signed to create yet another ceasefire by delegating more power to the rebel republics of Donbas and Luhansk regions in Ukraine. However, this has since been a failure by the OSCE and has only allowed Moscow more time to rebuild its arsenal of weapons and continue growing its military forces.

The challenges to Ukrainian NATO membership are primarily due to Russian and Chinese opposition. This opposition is deeply rooted in these countries’ disapproval of eastward NATO expansion. Ukrainian membership has consistently been stifled by threats of invasion or nuclear war from Russia. The current invasion of Ukraine is very much a response to NATO involvement and eastward expansion. As NATO continues to push its intent to allow Ukraine to join the military alliance, it only angers the Russian state further. Although NATO is a military alliance, Ukrainian membership would also stifle economic ties between the country and Russia. However, NATO seems to play the “good guy” in this scenario, as they have been quick to speak of membership but fail to solidify Ukrainian membership since the proposal in 2008. This is, of course, a strategic move by NATO to maintain some level of peace before granting admission to the alliance. However, it seems unlikely that Moscow will ever find peace in what they view as NATO’s eastward expansion.

Russia’s current invasion of Ukraine signifies the current world order. Its unimpeded invasion of Ukraine shows how Western liberal ideals of “peace” sometimes fail to address pressing and addressable issues. Sanctions and foreign aid can only do so much to stop a global power from embarking on additional invasions in Baltic states, but a militarized response from liberal global institutions, such as NATO, would likely result in total war—a significant deterrent for current liberalist societies. The acceptance of Ukrainian membership into NATO would also likely be viewed as a declaration of war by Moscow, which would again result in more war and less peace.

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